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In this article the author presents a participatory perspective on design and suggests a 
new role for the designer. The perspective is based on the idea of understanding design 
as a new language game shared by users and designers. He emphasizes the importance 
conditions for communication, practical skill and creativity in the design process. A 
dialectic between tradition and transcendence is seen as fundamental to design. 
I N SCANDINAVIA we have for two decades in research been concerned with participation and skill in design and use of computer arti-
facts. This paper is a theoretical reflection of that 
practice of participatory design. Is there a kind of 
family resemblance between design theory and 
practice of architecture, and the art and science 
of designing computer artifacts? From the point 
of view of designing computer artifacts the mature 
art and science of architecture has no doubt been 
most influential. The aim of this paper is, based 
on experience from designing computer artifacts, 
to explore the possibilities of a research and 
design dialogue between the different design 
cultures. In summary I have come to take the 
following position:1 
• Participatory design is a learning process 
where designers and users learn from each other. 
Really participatory design requires a shared 
form of life - a shared social and cultural back-
ground and a shared language. Hence, parti-
cipatory design is not only a question of users 
participating in design, but also a question of 
designers participating in use. The professional 
designer will try to share practice with the users. 
• By understanding design as a process of 
creating new design practices that have family 
resemblance with the daily practices of both 
users and designers we have an orientation for 
really doing design as skill based participation, a 
way of doing design thatmay help us to transcend 
some of the limits of formalization. To set up 
these design practices is a new role for the 
designer. Hence, the creative designer is con-
cerned with the practice of the users in organi-
zing the design process, understanding that every 
new design practice is a unique situated design 
experience. There is, however, paradoxically as 
it may sound, no requirements that the design 
practice make the same sense to users and desig-
ners, only that the designer sets the stage for a 
design practice so that participation make sense 
to all participants. 
• Practical understanding is a type of skill that 
should be taken seriously in a design practice, 
since the most important rules we follow in 
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skilful performance are embedded in that prac-
tice and defies formalization. 
• Creativity depends on the open-textured 
character of rule-following behavior, hence focus 
on traditional skill is not at the cost of creative 
transcendence, but a necessary condition. To 
support the dialectics between tradition and trans-
cendence is at the heart of design. 
• Traditional "systems descriptions" are not 
sufficient in a skill based participatory design 
approach. Design artifacts should not primarily 
be seen as means for creating true 'pictures of 
reality', but as means to help users and the 
designers to discuss and experience current situa-
tions and envision future ones. 
• No matter how much influence participation 
in principle may give, our design practices must 
transcend the boredom of traditional design meet-
ings if the design work is to be a meaningful and 
involving activity for all participants. Hence, 
formal democratic and participatory procedures 
for designing computer artifacts for democracy 
at work are not sufficient. Our design practices 
must also be organized in a way that make it 
possible for ordinary users not only to utilize 
their practical skill in the design work, but also 
having^ u« doing this. 
• A concerned approach for setting the stage 
for shared design practices using involving de-
sign artifacts make it possible for ordinary users 
to express their practical competence when parti-
cipating in the design process. With "design-by-
playing" approaches like the use of organizatio-
nal games we as designers can make useful 
interventions into the social interaction and so-
cial construction of an organizational reality. 
With "design-by-doing" approaches like the use 
of mock-ups and other prototyping design arti-
facts we can make it possible for users to get 
practical "hands-on" experiences of the techno-
logy under development. 
Background: 
Rethinking systems descr ipt ions 
A few years ago I was struck by something I had 
not "seen" before. Focusing on how perspectives 
make us select certain aspects of "reality" as 
important in a description, I had completely 
overseen my own presumption that descriptions 
in one way or another are "mirror-images" of 
"reality". On the ground of differences in interests 
in participatory design I questioned the objectivity 
in understanding design as a process of rational 
decision-making. Hence, I argued the importance 
of making descriptions from different perspec-
tives to get a more "true" picture. But I did not 
question the Cartesian epistemology and ontology 
of an inner-world of experiences (mind) and, an 
outer-world of objects, and language as our way 
of mirroring this outer-world of real objects. 
Focusing on which objects and which relations 
that should be represented in a systems description 
I took for granted the Cartesian mind body 
dualism which Wittgenstein so convincingly had 
rejected in Philosophical Investigations.2 Hence, 
though my purpose was the opposite, the sub-
jectivity of craft, artistry, passion, love and care 
were rendered invisible in the "descriptions" by 
my perspective.3 
I guess the reason that I now was stuck by my 
philosophical assumptions of rationalistic rea-
soning as epistemology and dualism as ontology 
had to do with our experiences from the UTOPIA 
project. The UTOPIA project was based on the 
idea of designing tools and environments for 
skilled work and good use quality products and 
services. To try out the ideas in practice, the 
project was, in 1981, started in cooperation bet-
ween the Nordic Graphic Workers' Union and 
researchers in Sweden and Denmark with ex-
periences of participatory design projects. It was 
a research project on user oriented design of, and 
training in, computer technology and work orga-
nization, especially page make-up and image 
processing in the newspaper industries. (In the 
Scandinavian languages UTOPIA is an acronym 
for Training, Technology, and Products from a 
Quality of Work Perspective).4 
The strategy we had chosen meant cooperation 
with the ultimate users of the design, i. e. graphic 
workers. To begin with, requirement specifica-
tions and systems descriptions were based on 
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traditional methods like interviews, and based 
on them graphical systems descriptions of ex-
isting and future systems. This was not very 
successful. However, the situation improved 
among other circumstances with the follo-
wing: 
• we started to understand traditional tools as a 
design ideal for computer artifacts - the de-
sign of tools for skilled work; 
• we made joint visits (designers and graphic 
workers together) to interesting plants (and 
discussed with users there), trade shows, ven-
dors, etc.; 
• we dedicated considerable time for learning 
fromeach other: designers about graphic work, 
and graphic workers about design; 
• we started to usedesign-by-doing-and-playing 
artifacts related to the language of graphic 
work, i . e. mock-ups, work organization games 
etc. 
This can be understood by two Wittgensteinian 
lessons that not had struck us before. 
Earlier we oversaw the Wittgensteinian lesson 
that, as Peter Winch has put it, "a cook is not a 
man who first has a vision of a pie and then tries 
to make it, he is a man skilled in cookery, and 
both his projects and his achievements spring 
from that skill."5 The fundamental question of 
skill in design was confused. 
We had in practice also overseen the funda-
mental Wittgensteinian lesson that what a picture 
describes is determined by its use. The role of 
descriptions as design artifacts was confused. 
Below I will illustrate how our "new" UTOPIAn 
design approach may be understood from a Witt-
gensteinian position, i . e. why design-by-doing-
and-playing and a skill based participatory de-
sign process works. More generally, I will argue 
that the role of "design artifacts" (models, proto-
types, mock-ups, descriptions, representations, 
etc.) in the design process is as reminders and as 
paradigm cases for our reflections of future 
computer artifacts and their use. The use of 
design artifacts brings earlier experiences to our 
mind. It is in this meaning we should understand 
them as representations. 
But first a few words on practice, the alternative 
point of departure as compared with the "picture 
theory of reality". 
Practice is reality 
To replace the picture theory of reality, practice 
as the social construction of reality is a strong 
candidate. In short this is what I understand as 
practice: Practice is our everyday practical acti-
vity. Practice is ontological. It is the human form 
of life. It is more fundamental than subject-
object relations. In practice we produce the world, 
both the world of objects and our knowledge 
about this world. Practice is both action and 
reflection. But practice is also a social activity. 
As such it is being produced co-operatively with 
others. To share practice is also to share under-
standing of the world with others. However, this 
production of the world and our understanding 
of it takes place in an already existing world. It 
is the product of former practice. Hence, as part 
of practice, knowledge has to be understood 
socially - as producing or reproducing social 
processes and structures as well as being the 
product of them.6 
With this background we can understand de-
sign of computer applications as a concerned 
social and historical activity in which artifacts 
and their use are envisioned, an activity and form 
of knowledge that is both planned and creative, 
and that deals with the contradiction between 
tradition and transcendence. 
Once struck by the "naive" Cartesian pre-
sumptions of a picture theory, what can be gained 
in design by shifting focus from correctness of 
descriptions to intervention into practice? What 
does it mean to take the position that what a 
picture describes is determined by its use? Most 
importantly there seems to be an opening for 
understanding the crucial role of skill and parti-
cipation in design, and in practical design to 
transcend some of the limits of formalization by 
the use of more action oriented design artifacts. 
Language-games 
To use language is to participate in language-
games, the Wittgensteinian notion of practice. In 
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discussing how we in practice follow (and some-
times break) rules as a social activity Wittgen-
stein asks us to think of games, how they are 
made up and played. Why games? 
We often think of games in terms of a playful, 
pleasurable engagement. I do not think that this 
aspect should be totally denied, but a more im-
portant aspect of the games children play is that 
they are most concerned activities, as are most of 
the common language-games we play in our 
ordinary language. Even professional language-
games of e. g. systems designers, architects or 
typographers, complicated as they may be, are 
grounded in our everyday ordinary language. 
We do not understand what counts as a game 
because we have an explicit definition, but be-
cause we are already familiar with other games. 
There is a kind of family resemblance between 
games. Similarly, professional language-games 
can be learned and understood because of their 
family resemblance with other language-games 
which we know how to play. 
Language-games, like the games we play as 
children, are social activities. To be able to play 
these games we have to learn to follow rules, 
rules that are socially created, but far from always 
explicitly existing. The rule-following behavior 
of being able to play together with others is more 
fundamental to a game than explicit regulative 
rules. Playing is interaction and cooperation. It is 
inter-subjective practice. To follow the rules in 
practice means to be able to act in a way that 
others in the game can understand. These rules 
are "embedded" in a given practice from which 
they cannot be distinguished. They are this prac-
tice. To know them is to "embody" them, to be 
able to practically apply them to a principally 
open class of cases. 
Language-games are performed both as speech 
acts and as other activities, as practice with "em-
bodied" meaning within societal and cultural 
institutional frameworks. To be able to participate 
in the practice of a specific language-game one 
has to share the form of life within which that 
practice is possible. This form of life includes 
our natural history as well as the social institu-
tions and traditions we are born into. This is prior 
to agreed social conventions and rational rea-
soning. Hence inter-subjective consensus is more 
a question of shared background and language 
than of stated opinions. Language as a means of 
communication requires agreement not only in 
definitions, but also in judgements.7 
This seems to make us prisoners of language 
and tradition, which is not really the case. Being 
socially created, the rules of language-games, as 
those of other games, can also be altered. 
There are, according to Wittgenstein, even 
games in which we make up and alter the rules 
according to which we play, as we go along.8 
Think of design and future use as language-
games. The very idea with the interventionistic 
design language-game is to change the rules of 
the language-game of use in a proper way. We 
change the rules as we go along. 
The idea of language-games entails and em-
phasis how we linguistically discover and con-
struct our world. However, language is under-
stood as our use of it, as our social, historic, and 
inter-subjective application of linguistic artifacts. 
As I see it, this is not a neglect of how we also 
come to understand the world by use of other 
artifacts. 
Artifacts and objects also play a fundamental 
role in a given language-game . A hammer is in 
itself a sign of what you can do with it in a certain 
language-game. And so is a computer artifact. 
These signs remind you of what you can do with 
it. In this light, an important aspect in the design 
of computer artifacts is that its signs remind the 
users of what they can do with the computer 
artifact in the language-games of use. Just as a 
hammer does.9 The success of "what-you-see-is-
what-you-get" and "direct manipulation" user 
interfaces has not to do with that they mirror 
reality in a more natural way, but that they 
provide better reminders of, and have a family 
resemblance with, the users earlier experiences.10 
This is also, as will be discussed below, the case 
with artifacts that we use in the design process. 
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Knowledge and design artifacts 
As designers we are involved in reforming prac-
tice, in our case typically computer artifacts and 
the way people use them. Hence, the language-
games of design changes the rules for other 
language-games - those of use of the artifacts. 
What are the conditions for this interplay and 
change? 
A common assumption behind most design 
approaches seems to be that the users must be 
able to give complete explicit descriptions of 
their demands. Hence, theemphasisis on methods 
to support this elucidation by means of require-
ment specifications, system descriptions etc.11 
In a Wittgensteinian approach, focus is not on 
the "correctness" of systems descriptions in de-
sign, on how well they mirror the desires in the 
mind of the users, or on how "correctly" they 
describe existing and future artifacts and their 
use. Systems descriptions are design artifacts, 
typically linguistic artifacts. The crucial question 
is how we use them, what role they play in the 
design process. 
The rejection of emphasis on "correctness" of 
descriptions is especially noteworthy: In this we 
are advised by the author of the perhaps once 
Design by Specification 
User-Oriented Designer-Oriented 
Design by specification. 
The traditional approach to design. Two or more 
language-games orcommunities-of-practice funda-
mentally related via requirement specifications. A 
fundamental competence of thedesigner is supposed 
to be the ability to formulate complete and correct 
systems descriptions. 
strongest arguments for a picture theory and the 
Cartesian approach to design - the young Witt-
genstein in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.12 A 
reason for this rejection is the fundamental role 
of practical knowledge and creative rule follow-
ing in language-games. 
Nevertheless, we know that systems descrip-
tions are useful in the the language-game of 
design. The new orientation suggested in a Witt-
gensteinian approach is that we, as mentioned, 
see these linguistic artifacts as a special kind of 
artifacts that we refer to as "typical examples" or 
"paradigm cases" when we describe something, 
or when we "inform" each other. That does not, 
however, make them models in the meaning of 
Cartesian mirror-images of reality.13 In the lan-
guage-game of design we use these artifacts as 
reminders and as paradigm cases for our re-
flections on future computer artifacts and their 
use. The use of design artifacts brings earlier 
experiences to our mind and it "bends" our way 
of thinking of the past and the future. I think that 
this is how we should understand them as re-
presentations. And this is how they "inform" our 
practice. If they are good design artifacts, they 
support good moves within a specific design 
language-game. The meaning of a design artifact 
is its use in a design language-game, not how it 
"mirrors reality". Important aspects are what 
kind of experience they represent, e. g. by having 
a family resemblance with artifacts that the par-
ticipants use in their everyday work activity. 
Here is a hint to why the breakthrough in the 
UTOPIA project was related to the use of design 
artifacts like prototypes and mock-ups. The point 
is that, since design artifacts understood as 
reminders or paradigm cases do not linguistically 
mirror a given or future practice, they can even 
be experiencedbeyond language, e.g. as practical 
use of a prototype or mock-up, an experience 
that can be further reflected upon in the langu-
age-games of design in ordinary language or in 
an artificial one. 
A good example from the UTOPIA project is 
an empty cardboard box with "desktop laser 
printer" written on the top. There is no functio-
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nality in this mock-up. Still it works very well in 
the design game of envisioning the future work 
of make-up staff. It reminded the participating 
typographers of the old "proof-machine" they 
used to work with in led technology. At the same 
time it suggested that with the help of new tech-
nology the old proof-machine could be re-
invented and enhanced. 
This design language-game was played in 
1982. At that time desktop laser printers only 
existed in the advanced research laboratories, 
and certainly typographers had never heard of 
them. To them the idea of a cheap laser printer 
was "unreal". It was our responsibility as pro-
fessional designers to be aware of such future 
possibilities, and to suggest them to the users. It 
was also our role to suggest this technical and 
organizational solution in such a way that the 
users could experience and envision what it 
would mean in their practical work, before too 
much time, money and development work were 
invested. Hence, the design game with the mock-
up laser printer. The mock-up made sense to all 
participants - users and designers.14 
This focus on non-linguistic design artifacts 
is not a rejection of the importance of linguistic 
ones. Understood as triggers for our imagination 
rather than as mirror-images of reality, they may 
well be our most wonderful human inventions. 
The narrative aspect of design artifacts is a 
challenge to tell stories that make sense to all 
participants. 
Rule fo l lowing and t rad i t ion 
Now to the paradox of rule following behavior. 
As mentioned, many rules that we follow in 
practice are scarcely to be distinguished from the 
behavior in which we perform them. We do not 
know that we have followed a rule until we have 
done it. The most important rules we follow in 
skilful performance defies formalization, but we 
still understand them. As Michael Polanyi, the 
philosopher of tacit knowledge, has put it: "It is 
pathetic to watch the endless efforts - equipped 
with microscopy and chemistry, with mathe-
matics and electronics - to reproduce a single 
violin of the kind the half-literate Stradevarius 
turned out as a matter of routine more than 200 
years ago."15 This is the traditional aspect of 
human rule following behavior. Polanyi points 
out that our perhaps most widely recognized 
explicit rule based system - the practice of 
Common Law - also uses earlier examples as 
paradigm cases. "This procedure recognizes the 
principle of all traditionalism that practical wis-
dom is more truly embodied in action than expres-
sed in the rules of action."16According to Polanyi 
this is also true for science, no matter how ratio-
nalistic and explicit it claims to be, the point 
being that, "while the articulate contents of 
science are successfully taught all over the world 
in hundreds of new universities, the unspecifi-
able art of scientific research has not yet pene-
trated to many of these."17 The art of scientific 
research defies complete formalization; it must 
partly be learned by examples from a master 
whose behavior one trusts. 
The suggestion to actively include skilled 
users in the design of new computer artifacts, 
when their old tools and working habits are 
redesigned, can hardly be given better illustra-
tions. After all, few social activities have been 
under such pressure of formalization as Law and 
Science, and still they are heavily dependent on 
practical experience and paradigm cases. Why 
should we expect other social institutions that 
have been under less pressure of formalization to 
be less based on practical experience, paradigm 
cases and tacit knowledge? 
Rule fo l lowing and t ranscendence 
In rule following behavior there is also the aspect 
of creative transcendence of traditional behavior. 
Again, this is what is typical of skilful human 
behavior, and exactly what defies precise for-
malization. By mastery of the rules comes the 
freedom to extend them. This creativity depends 
on the Wittgensteinian emphasis on the open-
textured character of rule-following behavior. 
To begin with, we learn to follow a rule as a kind 
of dressage, but in the end we do it as creative 
activity.18 To be able to follow a rule is to have 
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learned how to in practice continue an example 
we have been given. Mastery of the rules puts us 
in a position to invent new ways of carrying on. 
As the Wittgenstein expert Alan Janik has put it: 
"there is always and ineliminably the possibility 
thatwe can follow the rule in a wholly unforeseen 
way. This could not happen if we had to have an 
explicit rule to go on from the start"19, and he 
goes on arguing that "the possibility of radical 
innovation is, however, the logical limit of de-
scription. This is what tacit knowledge is all 
about."20 An this is epistemologically why there 
should be strong focus on skill both in design and 
in use of computer artifacts. We focus on tradi-
tional skill, not at the cost of creative trans-
cendence, but as a necessary condition for it. 
But what is the role of "new" external ideas 
and experiences in design? How are tradition 
and transcendence united in a Wittgensteinian 
approach. Could it for example mean utilizing 
something like Berthold Brecht's theatrical Ver-
fremdungseffekt to highlight transcendental un-
tried possibilities in everyday practice by pre-
senting a well-known practice in a new light? 
Yes, similar design artifacts and methods may be 
applied in a Wittgensteinian approach, since 
"the aspects of things that are most important to 
us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity". However, as Peter Winch put it, in 
a Wittgensteinian approach: "the only legitimate 
use of such a Verfremdungseffekt is to draw 
attention to the familiar and obvious, not to show 
that it is dispensable from our understanding."21 
Design artifacts, linguistic or not, may in a 
Wittgensteinian approach certainly be used to 
break down traditional understanding, but they 
must make sense in the users' ordinary language-
games. If the design artifacts are good, it is 
because they help users and designers to see new 
aspects of an already well known practice, not 
because they convey revolutionary ideas. In fact, 
this focus on traditional skill in interplay with 
design skill may be a hindrance to really revo-
lutionary designs. Put another way: Which tradi-
tional skill, and hence which potential users, that 
are to participate in a design language-game is 
not a given fact. Few designs, however, are 
really revolutionary, and for normal everyday 
reformistic design situations the participation of 
traditionally skilled users should be most reward-
ing in terms of quality of the product. 
Hence, the contradiction between tradition 
and transcendence seems to be fundamental to 
design. There can be focus on tradition or trans-
cendence in the artifacts to be used. Should a 
word processor be designed as a traditional type-
writer or as something totally new? Another 
dimension is professional competence. Should 
the "old" skills of typographers be what is desig-
ned for or should new knowledge replace these 
skills in future use? Along the same dimension 
we have division of labour and cooperation? 
Should the new design support the traditional 
organization in a composing room or suggest 
new ways of cooperation between typographers 
and journalists? There is also the contradiction 
between Uadition and transcendence in the goods 
or services to be produced. Should the design 
support the traditional graphical production or 
completely new services like in desktop publish-
ing? Tradition and transcendence, that is the 
dialectical foundation of design. 
Design-by-doing-and-playing 
- new "rules of the game" 
What do we as designers have to do to qualify as 
participants in the language-games of the users? 
What do users have to learn to qualify as parti-
cipants in the language-game of design? And 
which means can we develop in design to facilitate 
these learning processes? 
//"designers and users share the same form of 
life it should be possible to overcome the gap 
between the different language-games. It should 
at least in principle be possible to develop the 
practice of design so that there is enough family 
resemblance between a specific language-game 
of design and the language-games the design of 
the computer artifact is intervening in. A media-
tion should be possible. 
But what are the conditions for this " i f ? To 
Wittgenstein it makes no sense to ask questions 
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beyond a given form of life. In afamous quotation 
he says that "if a lion could talk, we could not 
understand him."22 In the arguments below, I 
have assumed that the conditions for a common 
form of life are possible to create, that the lions 
and sheep of industrial life can live together. This 
is more of a normative stand-point of how design 
ought to be, a democratic hope rather than a 
reflection over general political conditions for 
its realization.23 
To possess the competence required to parti-
cipate in a language-game requires a lot of lear-
ning within that practice. But in the beginning all 
you can understand, is what you have already 
understood in another language-game. You under-
stand because of the family resemblance between 
the two language-games. 
What kind of design artifacts may be applied 
to support this interplay between language-
games, and to make this mediation from the one 
to the other possible? I think that what we in the 
UTOPIA project called a design-by-doing-and-
playing approach, e. g. the use of prototyping, 
mock-ups, scenarios etc., are good examples. 
The language-games played in design-by-
doing-and-playing can be viewed both from the 
point of view of the users and of the designers. 
This kind of design becomes a language-game in 
which the users learn about possibilities and 
constraints of new computer artifacts that may 
become part of their ordinary language-games. 
The designers become the teachers that teach the 
users how to participate in this particular lan-
guage-game of design. In order to set up these 
kind of language-games the designers have to 
learn from the users. 
However, paradoxical as it sounds, users and 
designers do not really have to understand each 
other in playing language-games of design-by-
doing together. Participation in a language-game 
of design and the use of design artifacts can make 
constructive but different sense, to users and 
designers. Wittgenstein notes that "when child-
ren play at trains their game is connected with 
their knowledge of trains. It would nevertheless 
be possible forthe children of atribe unacquainted 
with trains to learn this game from others, and to 
play it without knowing that it was copied from 
anything. One might say that the game did not 
make the same sense as to us."24 As long as the 
language-game of design is not a nonsense acti-
vity to any participant, but a shared activity for 
better understanding and good design, mutual 
understanding is desired but not really required. 
User par t ic ipat ion and sk i l l 
The users can participate in the language-game 
of design, because the design artifacts applied 
give their design activities a family resemblance 
with the language-games that they play in ordi-
nary use situations. An example from the UTOPIA 
project is a typographer sitting at a mock-up of a 
future workstation for page make-up, actually 
doing make-up on the simulated future computer 
artifact.25 
The family resemblance is only one aspect of 
the methods. The other is what can be expressed. 
I think that it is reasonable to say that in design-
by-doing-and playing the user will be able ex-
press both propositional knowledge and practical 
understanding. Not only could e. g. the typogra-
pher working at the mock-up tell that the screen 
should be bigger because then it would be possible 
to show a full spread, something which is impor-
tant in page make-up. He could also show what 
he meant by "cropping a picture", by actually 
doing it, as he said it. It was also possible for him 
to express practical understanding in the sense of 
sensuous knowledge by familiarity. He could 
e. g. while working at the mock-up, express the 
fact that when the artifact is designed one way he 
can get a good balanced page, but not, when it is 
designed another way. 
Designer par t ic ipat ion and sk i l l 
For us as designers it was possible to express 
both propositional knowledge and practical un-
derstanding about design and computer artifacts. 
Not only could we express propositional know-
ledge like "design-by-doing-and-playing design 
artifacts have many advantages as compared 
with traditional systems descriptions" or "bit-
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map displays bigger than 22 inch and with a 
resolution of more than 2 000 * 2 000 pixels are 
very expensive". In the language-game of de-
sign-by-doing-and-playing we could also ex-
press practical understanding of technical con-
straints and possibilities by "implementing" them 
in the mock-up, prototype, simulation, experi-
mental situation etc. Not least simulations of the 
user interface, the sign aspect of thefuture artifacts 
discussed above, the reminders of what they are 
for were important in this language-game of 
design. 
However, as designers, our practical under-
standing will most of all be expressed as the 
ability to construct specific language-games of 
design in such a way that the users can develop 
their understanding of future use by participating 
in design processes. 
There is, however, as mentioned above, an-
other important aspect of language-games: We 
make up the rules as we go along. To assist in 
such transcendental rule breaking activities 
should be an important competence of a skilled 
designer. Perhaps, this is the artistic competence 
a good designer needs? 
I have argued that in design-by-doing-and-
playing language-games users can express both 
prepositional knowledge and practical know-
ledge. From both these kinds of activities there is 
much that will prove useful in the design process 
for the designers. But it should be observed that 
most of the practices that can be learned are 
examples of correct and incorrect moves in the 
language-game of use, not formal descriptions 
of this practice. 
However, in language-games of design based 
on participation and design-by-doing, much can 
also be learned from the users by the practice that 
is shared in the design activity. To take some 
examples from the UTOPIA project, activities such 
as joint visits to work places, with situations in 
some aspects similar to the ones being designed 
for, may be a kind of "design artifact" from 
which both designers and users can learn and 
create the language-game of the specific design 
they both are involved in. To really learn the 
Design by Participation (The design language-game) 
Design by participation. 
New rules of the design language-game. Two or 
more language-games or communities-of-practice 
fundamentally related via shared experiences in a 
common design language-game which has a family 
resemblance with the ordinary language-games of 
both users and professional designers. Afundamen-
tal competence of the designer is the ability to set 
the stage for a shared design language-game that 
makes sense to all participants. 
language-game of the use activity by fully parti-
cipating in that language-game is of course an 
even more radical attempt by the designer. Less 
radical but perhaps more practical would be that 
we as designers concentrate our design activity 
to just a few language-games of use, and for 
them develop a practical understanding of use-
ful specific language-games of design.26 Finally, 
there seems to be a new and fundamental role for 
the designer as the one who sets the stage for a 
shared design language-game that makes sense 
to all participants - designers and users. 
Beyond the boredom of design 
Given the Scandinavian societal, historical and 
cultural setting skill based participatory design 
is associated with the democracy aspect of de-
sign. In this paper some ideas inspired by Lud-
wig Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations 
was applied to the everyday practice of skill 
based participatory design in search for a theo-
retical foundation. Practical understanding and 
family resemblance between language-games 
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became fundamental concepts for participatory 
design. 
The concept language-games gives, however, 
also associations to a playful activity, but which 
are the practical conditions for such pleasurable 
engagement in design? Is the right to democratic 
participation enough? 
In fact, the experiences from our participatory 
design projects indicates that most users find 
design work boring, sometimes so little engaging 
that they stop participating. This problem is not 
unique for the Scandinavian participatory de-
sign tradition. It has for example been addressed 
by by Russell Ackoff. He has concluded that for 
participation in design to be successful itrequires 
that: it makes a difference for the participants; 
implementation of the results are likely; it is fun 
to participate.27 
The two first points concern the political side 
of participation in design, the users must have a 
guarantee that their design efforts are taken 
seriously. The last point concerns the design 
process. No matter how much influence parti-
cipation may give, it has to transcend the boredom 
of traditional design meetings to really support 
design as meaningful and involved action. The 
design work should be treated as a play. In our 
own later projects we have tried to take this 
challenge seriously and integrated the use of 
future workshops, metaphorical design, role play-
ing and organizational game into work-oriented 
design.28 
Hence, as a last reminder from Scandinavian 
participatory design of computer artifacts it 
should be stated that formal democratic and 
participatory procedures for designing computer 
artifacts for democracy at work are not sufficient. 
Our design language-games must also be orga-
nized in a way that make it possible for ordinary 
users not only to utilize their practical skill in the 
design work, but also having fun doing this. 
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